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SECURITY INTEREST IN AFTER-ACQUIRED
CONSUMER GOODS
Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Finance Co.'
Steve and Nancy Tinsman obtained a loan from Moline Beneficial
Finance Co. in order to make a down payment on furniture. The Truth-in-
Lending disclosure statement given to the Tinsmans stated that Beneficial
retained a security interest in "[a]ll consumer goods of every kind now
owned or hereafter acquired by Debtors in replacement of said consumer
goods . . . and now owned or hereafter located on the debtors' place of
residence." 2 The Tinsmans filed suit alleging that this disclosure violated
the Truth-in-Lending Act.3 Summary judgment was granted for the plain-
tiffs, and they were awarded the statutory recovery of twice the finance
charge plus attorney's fees. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seyenth Circuit affirmed.
The court of appeals held that Beneficial's disclosure of the security
interest was worded so broadly that it included more after-acquired con-
sumer goods than were allowed under Uniform Commercial Code
[U.C.C.] section 9-204(2),' and therefore did not clearly set forth the
security interest in an accurate manner, in violation of the Truth-in-Lend-
ing Act.
The Tinsman case illustrates some fundamental characteristics of the
Truth-in-Lending Act. First, the consumer need not actually be harmed.
Steve Tinsman was a former bank employee who had audited loan compu-
tations,5 and he was familiar with the type of security agreement used in the
transaction:6 He was not "shopping for credit," so at least his initial credit
decision was not affected by the disclosure. At any rate, since the disclosure
made Beneficial's loan appear less attractive than it really was, it is unlikely
1. 531 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1976).
2. Id. at 818.
3. Id. at 816. The Tinsmans sued on three different theories, but the court of
appeals decided only on the theory that the disclosure did not dearly set forth the
security interest in an accurate manner. The other alleged violations were inade-
quate disclosure of the method of computing the unearned portion of the finance
charge and failure to describe each item in the finance charge. Id. n.1.
4. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-204(2) (1973). Illinois has adopted the revision
of Article 9 of the U.C.C., but this amendment did not substantively alter the
relevant provisions. Section 9-204(2) appeared in the previous version of the Code
at § 9-204(4).
5. Brief for Appellant, Appendix at 39, Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Fin.
Co., 531 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1976).
6. Id. at 37, 38.
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that Beneficial stood to gain by its breadth. It is possible, however, that such
an overly broad disclosure statement might be used to dupe an unwary
consumer into surrendering more goods upon default than the lender
could lawfully obtain.7
Second, this case demonstrates the devices in the Truth-in-Lending
Act which serve to make it self-executing. The amount loaned in Tinsman
was approximately $300,' while the total award which Beneficial had to pay
was over $3,000.1 The strong economic incentive for the creditor to comply
with the Act is obvious. In addition, there is an incentive for ihe debtor to
enforce the Act. The Act allows recovery for actual damages,10 or twice the
finance charge with a maximum recovery of $1,000 and a minimum of
$10011 plus reasonable attorney's fees.12 The $3,000 judgment in Tinsman
is graphic evidence of what can occur when a faulty collateral clause is used
in a consumer loan setting.
The most important aspect of Tinsman, however, is its holding that if a
security interest purports to attach to more goods than is allowed under
state law, a disclosure of that security interest must state those limits to
comply with the Truth-in-Lending Act. This holding will be examined in
light of statutory provisions, administrative regulations, judicial decisions,
and other interpretations.
The Truth-in-Lending Act' was enacted in 1968 "to assure a meaning-
ful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit."'4 It utilizes "[o]ne of the oldest and most
prevalent methods of regulating consumer transactions,"1 that of requir-
ing the seller to disclose information to his buyer. Pursuant to a broad
grant of authority 6 the Federal Reserve Board promulgated Regulation
Z 17 to supply the details of disclosure requirements. Section 1640 of the Act
provides a civil remedy for a failure to disclose required information.
Additional information may be disclosed, but only if it will not mislead or
confuse.' 8
7. Sneed v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Hawaii 1976); Evans v.
Household Fin. Corp., CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 99,007 (1973).
8. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 27.
9. Id. at 36.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
11. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1977).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1605 (1970).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
15. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulations in Consumer Transactions,
1973 Wis. L. REV. 400.
16. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); 15
U.S.C. § 1604 (1970); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(s) (West Supp. 1977).
17. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq. (1977).
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The general standard under the Truth-in-Lending Act is "clear and
conspicuous" disclosure.1 9 For example, one court held that since the
disclosure form is for the borrower's benefit it must be presented in a
conceptual framework that he can easily comprehend. ° Other courts have
noted that since the statute is remedial in nature, there must be strict
compliance with its technical terms. 21 Similarly, all ambiguities in the disclo-
sure statement should be construed against the creditor, it being both the
drafter and the party upon whom the statute imposes the burden of
compliance.
22
In addition to dictating how disclosures must be made, the Truth-in-
Lending Act and Regulation Z set out the specifics of what must be
disclosed. The disclosure requirements differ depending on the type of
transaction involved. The instant case involved security interests in connec-
tion with consumer loans. The specific disclosure requirements are set out
in 15 U.S.C. section 1639(a)(8) 23 and Regulation Z section 226.8(b)(5).24 As
to security interests in general there are basically two requirements: (1) a
description of any security interest retained, and (2) a clear identification of
the property to which it relates. In applying the first requirement, courts
have held that the disclosure statement must reveal the existence of a
chattel mortgage,25 and if a vendor's lien is retained, it too must be dis-
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. V 1975); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a)
(1977).
20. Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1976).
21. Powers v. Sims & Levins Realtors, 396 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Va. 1975); Woods
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975).
22. Sneed v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Hawaii 1976).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a) (1970) provides:
Any creditor making a consumer loan [subject to this section] shall disclose
... the following items, to the extent applicable:
(8) A description of any security interest held . . . by the creditor in
connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the
property to which the security interest relates.
24. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.. § 226.8(b) (1977) provides:
In any transaction subject to this section, the following items, as applicable,
shall be disclosed:
(5) A description or identification of the type of any security interest held
... by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear
identification of the property to which the security interest relates or, if
such property is not identifiable, an explanation of the manner in which
the creditor retains or may acquire a security interest in such property
which the creditor is unable to identify. . . . If after-acquired property
will be subject to the security interest. . . this fact shall be clearly set forth
in conjunction with the description or identification of the type of security
interest held . . ..
25. Wilson v. Shreveport Loan Corp., 404 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. La. 1975).
1977]
3
Biesterfeld: Biesterfeld: Truth-In-Lending Disclosure Requirements
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
closed." The second requirement, dealing with identification of the prop-
erty, has been held not to require particularization of each article se-
cured. 7 At least one court, however, has held that the description in the
disclosure statement must use terms synonymous with those used in the
security agreement.28
In addition to these disclosure requirements dealing with security
interests in general, Regulation Z supplements the Act by adding a disclo-
sure requirement dealing specifically with security interests in after-ac-
quired property. 9 Regulation Z section 226.8(b)(5) states: "If after-ac-
quired property will be subject to the security interest. . . this fact shall be
clearly set forth in conjunction with the description or identification of the
type of security interest held, retained or acquired." The language seems
clear. Nonetheless, the courts and the Federal Reserve Board have had
considerable difficulty in applying this provision.
These problems in applying the disclosure requirements as to security
interests in after-acquired property have arisen in connection with U.G.C.
section 9-204(2),o although the result reached with respect to the Code
should also apply to other state statutes restricting security interests in
after-acquired goods."' U.C.C. section 9-204(4)(b) prohibits the attachment
of security interests in after-acquired consumer goods, when given as
additional security, unless the debtor acquires rights in the goods within
ten days. If, contrary to the U.C.C., a creditor attempts to take a security
interest in all after-acquired consumer goods, the question arises whether a
failure to set out this ten day limitation in a disclosure statement violates the
Truth-in-Lending Act. The courts considering this question have held that
it does violate the Act, but they have done so on confused and conflicting
theories.
Some courts have held that disclosure of a security interest which
covers more after-acquired consumer goods than is permissible constitutes
additional information stated so as to mislead or confuse in violation of
Regulation Z section 226.6(c).12 This conclusion seems strained. Section
26. Starks v. Orleans Motors, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. La.), aff'd mem., 500
F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. Slatter v. Aetna Fin. Co., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,767 (N.D. Ga.
1974); Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
28. Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1977).
30. U.C.C. § 9-204(4)(b) (1972) provides:
No security interests attaches under an after-acquired property clause to
consumer goods. . . when given as additional security unless the debtor
acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives value.
31. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §422.417(3)(a) (West 1974) (prohibits most
security interests in household goods). See also U.G.C.C. § 3.301 (1974) (prohibits
security interests in after-acquired goods in sale and lease transactions); NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT §§ 2.416(2), .416(6)(a),
.416(6)(c) (1973) (prohibits security interests in consumer goods other than those
worked on or sold, and in all after-acquired property).
32. Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Ill. 1974); Kenney
[Vol. 42
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226.6(c) provides that additional information may be disclosed, provided it is
not misleading or confusing. One must distinguish between a disclosure
which purports to cover property additional to that allowed under state law
and a disclosure which states information additional to that which is re-
quired under the Truth-in-Lending Act. No additional information is
disclosed in these cases. The creditor is simply disclosing those terms of the
transaction which the Act requires him to disclose.3" Section 226.6(c) by its
terms does not apply to disclosure of required information. Therefore, a
required disclosure of information that confuses or misleads the consumer
does not violate the Truth-in-Lending Act.
Some courts have ignored the fact that section 226.6(c) applies only to
"additional information" and have held that a disclosure of a security
interest in after-acquired consumer goods which does not set out the ten
day limitation in U.C.C. 9-204(2) is misleading and confusing and there-
fore violates the Act, without first finding it to be additional information.
3 4
One court attempted to justify this by stating that section 226.6(c) is a
"catch-all" provision for violations not specifically fitting within a particular
category.3 5 The answer to this contention is that section 226.6(c) is clearly
not a "catch-all" provision, but is expressly limited to additional informa-
tion. It does not prohibit all misleading or confusing disclosures.
Other courts in dealing with this have concluded that a failure to
disclose the ten day limitation violates the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regu-
lation Z because it fails to define the extent of the security interest 6 or it
fails to make a complete disclosure of the security interest retained. 7 These
conclusions also fail to bear scrutiny. Regulation Z section 226.8(b)(5)
requires only that the creditor disclose which type of security device is
being employed, i.e., whether a chattel mortgage or a vendor's lien or a
U.C.C. "security interest '3 is retained. The fact that after-acquired prop-
erty will be subject to the security interest in no way affects the type of
security interest involved.
One case held that a disclosure of a security interest in all after-
v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972). The lower
court in Tinsman also based its decision upon this ground, inter alia, but the court
of appeals declined to decide this question. 531 F.2dat 819.
33. FRB Letter No. 829 (August 22, 1974), 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
31,151.
34. Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975); Evans v.
Household Fin. Corp., CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 99,007 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
35. Houston v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 414 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
36. In re Dunne, 407 F. Supp. 308 (D.R.I. 1976); Johnson v. Associates Fin.,
Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
37. Pollock v. General Fin. Corp., 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976); Willis v. Town
Fin. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
38. Under the U.C.C. the single term "security interest" is used for all security
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acquired consumer goods violates Regulation Z section 226.8(b)(5) in that it
fails to make a clear identification of the property to which the security
interest relates.3 9 Regulation Z does indeed require a clear identification of
the property to which the security interest relates. However, the wording of
this provision suggests that this "clear identification" requirement was not
meant to apply to after-acquired property. The last sentence of section
226.8(b)(5) states that if after-acquired property will be subject to the
security interest, this fact must be clearly set forth in conjunction with the
description or identification of the type of security interest retained. There
is no reference to "this fact" also being set out in conjunction with the clear
identification of the property. Also, since stating that after-acquired prop-
erty will be subject to the security interest is in fact a manner of identify-
ing property to which the security interest relates, it would be redundant to
require both. This strongly suggests that the "clear identification" require-
ment was not intended to apply to after-acquired property.
In addition to the case law on this question, there is also a series of
unofficial Federal Reserve Board staff letters interpreting Regulation Z.4
The degree to which courts are willing to accept these staff letters varies
considerably. One court stated they were entitled to great weight, 41 while
another castigated them as being the product of lobbying by the credit
industry.4" Despite these aspersions, the Federal Reserve Board has a
central role in Truth-in-Lending matters, and to the extent these staff
letters indicate the Board's thinking, they are of value.
One letter that has found considerable support in the cases is Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) Letter No. 829. It states that each creditor must
insure that all information disclosed is accurate according to the applicable
state law. In particular it states that the description of the security interest
must accurately reflect the type of security interest that may legally be
acquired. 4' This conclusion has been seriously questioned in later letters.
For example, FRB Letter No. 983 expressly modifies Letter No. 829 and
states that upon further consideration the staff believed it would be suffi-
cient, in disclosing an after-acquired property clause under section
226.8(b)(5), to state simply that the security interest covered such proper-
ty 44 Still another letter, No. 1053, 4' retreated from that statement. While it
39. Sneed v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 410 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Hawaii 1976).
40. These FRB letters are drafted by the staff in response to inquiries from
interested persons. They are not binding on the courts and are intended to serve as
an informal means of helping creditors comply with the technicalities of Regulation
Z. They must be distinguished from the official interpretations which are given in
accordance with Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d) (1977). Good faith reliance
upon the latter is a defense. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (Supp. V 1975).
41. Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. Willis v. Town Fin. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
43. (August 22, 1974), 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,151.
44. (December 30, 1975), 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,323.
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too stated that the clear language of section 226.8(b)(5) did not require
more than a simple statement that after-acquired property may be subject
to the security interest, it went on to say that the creditor may not affirma-
tively misstate the scope of the security interest. It would be an "inaccurate
and misleading disclosure in violation of Regulation Z" to disclose an
interest in all after-acquired property, when the interest would actually
attach only to property acquired within a certain period of time.4 6 It is
noteworthy that no citation to the statute or the Regulation is given for this
conclusion.
Apparently, then, the latest FRB staff interpretation would permit a
disclosure that after-acquired property "may" be subject to the security
interest, but would prohibit a disclosure that "all" after-acquired property
would be subject to the security interest. At least one court has rejected
precisely this distinction. 7 Yet even if this were the distinction the staff
meant to draw, it is difficult to understand the rationale behind it. The
remedy for a violation of the state law should be sought in that same law.48
If the disclosure statement clearly and conspicuously sets forth the terms of
the credit transaction4 9 the fact that those terms do not conform to some
state law does not make the disclosure inadequate.5 0
An overview of the various statutes, regulations, cases, and interpreta-
tions reveals that there is virtual unanimity of opinion that the Truth-in-
Lending Act has been violated when a security interest is disclosed in terms
which cover more than is permissible under the applicable state law, and
Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Finance Co. follows this consensus. However,
the theories advanced to support these conclusions are confused and con-
tradictory. Nor is this state of confusion surprising, since a close examina-
tion of the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z reveals little basis for
finding a violation. There is no express requirement that the disclosures
required under the Act be in conformity with the substantive limitations
imposed by state law. If the Truth-in-Lending Act had been intended to
supply a remedy for violations of other laws, a statement to that effect is
conspicuously absent. The purpose of the Act is effectuated by a clear and
conspicuous disclosure of the terms of the transaction, for if those terms




47. Pollock v. General Fin. Corp., 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976).
48. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1970) with U.C.C. § 9-203(4), which together
strongly suggest that neither was intended to affect the other in any way.
49. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 361 (1973),
where Chief Justice Burger states that a typical disclosure provision in the Truth-in-
Lending Act "requires merchants . . . to disclose certain contract information."
(emphasis added).
50. Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 526 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1976); Kenney
v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939, 946 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
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